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Abstract
Talented managers may leave the rm in order to work elsewhere. Focusing on the
portability of managersresources, we develop a model in which managerial compensation
is designed to prevent ine¢ cient departure. The model rationalizes the widespread use of
at salaries in combination with performance-vesting stock options and is consistent with
observed di¤erences in compensation contracts across individuals, rms, industries, and
countries.
1 Introduction
Managerial compensation usually comprises two main components, namely, a xed salary and
a stock-option package (Murphy (1999) and Frydman and Saks (2010)).
For economists, these contracts pose a puzzle. The leading theory of compensation con-
tracts emphasizes that variable pay encourages the manager to work harder, at the cost of
providing less insurance (Holmström (1979)). But this e¤ort inducement theory has several
implications for which there is only limited empirical support. First, variable compensation
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ought to be carefully indexed so as to lter out the e¤ect of exogenous shocks on measured
performance. But in reality many managerial contracts, especially those that involve large
amounts of stock options, contain little or no explicit indexing (see Lazear and Oyer (2012)
and references therein). Second, pay ought to depend on performance at all performance levels.
In reality, most managerspay is bounded below by a substantial salary. Third, there ought
to be a negative relationship between the riskiness of the environment and the power of the
incentives. In reality the relationship is as likely to be positive (Prendergast (2002)). Fourth,
variable pay should only be linked to performance measures that the manager can substantially
inuence. In reality, options and stocks are frequently being used to reward broad layers of
managers and other worker categories (Oyer and Schaefer (2005)).
Alternative theories of compensation focus on recruitment and retention rather than moti-
vation.1 While these theories have generated a smaller academic literature, they are popular
among practitioners. For example, according to the survey data reported by Ittner et al. (2003),
worker retention is the most important motive for equity grant programs in new economy
rms.
Here, we explore theoretically the hypothesis that variable compensation primarily serves
the purpose of retaining managers when their outside options are attractive.2 Building on
previous insights of Hashimoto (1979), Harris and Holmström (1982), Holmström and Ricart
i Costa (1986), Blakemore et al. (1987), and Oyer (2004), we construct a simple model of
retention-based compensation. We nd that the optimal contract is composed of a salary and a
non-indexed stock option package. Besides explaining contractsshape, the model is consistent
with observed variation in compensation practices across rms, industries, and countries.
The key assumption is that there is uncertainty concerning the future value of the managers
work, and that the inside and outside value are closely correlated. When the value becomes
high enough, a manager who is only paid a xed salary would leave the rm. Stock options are
in the moneyprecisely when times are good and the managers value increases. Thus, if the
1In this paper, we shall neglect the potentially important role of incentive schemes in screening workers
according to their privately observed characteristics; see, for example, Lazear (2005) and the references therein.
2While we lack formal measures of portability, many observations suggest that it is empirically relevant.
Garvin (1983) nds that younger rms have more value in human than physical assets, and argues that this
fact could explain why there are more spin-o¤s among younger rms. Likewise, Bhide (2000) nds that 71
percent of the rms included in the Inc 500, a list of young, fast-growing companies, were founded by people
who replicated or modied an idea encountered in their previous employment. Detailed evidence on portability
in the laser industry and from investment banks is o¤ered by Klepper and Sleeper (2005) and Groysberg et al.
(2008) respectively.
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manager holds a su¢ cient quantity of options that are forfeited upon departure, she will stay
with the rm even in good times. This model applies to all workers whose value to the rm
co-moves with industry conditions, and therefore explains why pay is linked to the rms stock
price for categories of workers whose individual e¤orts cannot a¤ect the stock price much.
Our argument is particularly closely related to the work of Holmström and Ricart i Costa
(1986). There too, the optimal compensation is in the form of an option contract, with the xed
salary being due to the managers risk aversion and the variable pay being due to the managers
inability to commit to staying when outside opportunities become attractive. Beyond recalling
this result, which is often forgotten in current discussions about managerial pay, we make three
contributions. First, we reformulate and streamline the model to emphasize that its logic does
not depend on uncertainty about the managers characteristics. Even industry-wide variation
in market conditions can create the required variation in the managers outside option. Second,
we parametrize the model in such a way as to admit a broad range of comparative static results.
Third, we demonstrate that the models predictions are broadly in line with recently available
evidence.
For example, the model entails the following predictions. (i) The relative importance of
stock options in managerial compensation depends on the portability of the managers human
capital. If portability is high, the salary will be low and the option package large. (ii) The
relative value of the option package is greater when the rms value is more uncertain. (iii) The
legal environment matters. When the managers best outside option is to set up a new rm,
start-up funding is easier to acquire when the legal system functions well, and we predict that
there is more variable pay in good legal environments. (iv) Turnover is higher when the industry
is performing poorly. (v) Severance pay compensates the manager for the di¤erence between
current compensation and the outside option, and need not be specied in the contract.
Apart from Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), we are not aware of any previous model
that fully explains why managers are paid a combination of xed salary and non-indexed stock
options.3 Among theoretical papers considering the retention motive, Hashimoto (1979) and
Blakemore et al. (1987) merely assume that contracts are piece-wise linear. Oyer (2004) and
Giannetti (2011) assume linear contracts, and thus by construction fails to account for the lower
bound to compensation that options imply. Dutta (2003) derives a linear contract from rst
3Models that attempt to explain how option packages vary with rm and market conditions, such as Johnson
and Tian (2000) and Kuang and Suijs (2006), merely impose a combination of salary and options.
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principles, but similarly fails to account for the lower bound to payments.4 Papers emphasizing
e¤ort inducement usually impose a linear relationship between pay and performance, which in
turn can be justied with reference to Holmström and Milgrom (1987). Hence, by construc-
tion, these models also fail to account for options.5 Failing to account for the exact contractual
shape is not necessarily a major drawback of a model, but here it is quite problematic because
the empirically observed contracts appear to be so far from optimal, given standard assump-
tions about managerspreferences and the behavior of stock prices (Hall and Murphy (2002);
Dittmann and Maug (2009)).6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 derives
the optimal compensation contract. Comparative static results are presented and discussed
in Section 4. We then develop two extensions. Section 5 considers the possibility of e¢ cient
inter-industry turnover and provides an explanation for severance pay. Section 6 considers the
case in which the manager must engage in costly search in order for attractive outside options
to be available, admits e¢ cient intra-industry turnover, and provides an explanation for pay
caps. Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic model
A rm needs a manager to run a two-period project. In order to recruit a manager with
appropriate talent and retain this manager until the project completes, the rm proposes a
contract which species pay as a function of the economys state as well as the managers
characteristics.
To a rst approximation, both the rms owners and all potential managers are assumed to
be risk neutral and care only about total expected consumption.7 However, choosing between
two contracts that yield the same expected pay but di¤erent risk, we assume that the manager
strictly prefers the least risky compensation, whereas the owners remain indi¤erent. That is, the
4Pakes and Nitzan (1983) examine how contracts can be designed to retain research personnel. Their focus
is similar to ours, but the contract derived is generally not linear in performance and it depends on the potential
rivalry between old and a new rm given that the researcher leaves.
5Innes (1990) derives an option-like contract, but exogenously imposes monotonicity.
6However, Dittmann et al. (2010) show that observed contracts can be approximately justied if managers
are su¢ ciently loss averse.
7We could dispense by the second assumption by explicitly modeling the possibilities of borrowing for con-
sumption. However, like most of the managerial compensation literature we refrain from a realistic study of the
intertemporal consumption decision.
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di¤erence in risk aversion between the rm and the manager is lexicographically small. While
the assumption is quite unrealistic, as evidenced by the large premium required by managers to
accept options instead of cash (Hall and Murphy (2002)), here it is an innocent simplication.
In Appendix B we explain why all our main conclusions remain valid even if the manager is
strictly risk averse.
The rms owners have enough wealth to be nancially unconstrained. The managers
wealth is denoted ! and is assumed to be non-negative and the same for all potential managers.
For most of the results, the managers wealth is irrelevant. Therefore, ! = 0 except when
otherwise noted.
The talent  di¤ers across potential managers. Both the rms owners and the potential
managers are completely informed about the environment.
In what follows, we simply refer to the agents as the rmand the managerrespectively.
2.1 The project
If the manager stays through the second period, the project generates revenue
RS = pq () ;
where q denotes the output, and p denotes the outputs price.8 We assume that the production
function satises the conditions q0 () > 0; q00 ()  0, and that the managers talent belongs to
some interval T = [0;  ]. The price p is assumed to be uncertain when the project starts and
to be realized at the end of the rst period. The uncertainty is captured by the probability
density function f(p) with support P  R+. Let p denote the expected price.
If the manager leaves already after one period, the project generates revenue
RL = RS  (1  )pq () ;
where  2 [0; 1]. Next, we interpret the parameter  in more detail.
2.2 The outside opportunity
A manager who leaves the rm at the end of rst period, can potentially generate a prot
pq ()   I, where I  0 denotes an investment cost. If I = 0, we can think of the manager
8Other interpretations of q and p are of course possible.
5
as working for an existing competitor. If I is large, we may think of the manager setting up a
new rm. Except for the international comparisons that we consider in Section 4.4, our results
do not depend on the size of I.
The portability parameter represents the resources that a departing manager can legally
take away from the rm and utilize elsewhere.9 The portability parameter is central to the
model. In reality, portability depends on, among other things, the nature of the managers
expertise, the availability of intermediate goods, intellectual property rights protection, the
ability to include credible no compete clauses in the managerial contract, and so on.
By making the assumptions   1 and I  0, and by the denition of RL, we focus on the
case in which the departure of a manager in the midst of a project is ine¢ cient. If the manager
departs, the rm loses more than the manager gains. (Section 5 and 6 extend the basic model
by examining e¢ cient turnover.)
Consider now the case of I > 0. In order to take advantage of the outside opportunity
and become an entrepreneur, a departing manager must be able to fund the investment I. Let
the nancial markets required rate of return be normalized to 0. To capture frictions in the
nancial market, we assume that nancial contracts be imperfectly enforced, applying a simple
version of the model of Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011): An entrepreneur who diverts resources
is apprehended with probability ' < 1. With probability 1 ' the diversion attempt succeeds
and the entrepreneur can enjoy the illegally diverted revenues. In case of a failed diversion
attempt, the entrepreneur has to give up all nancial resources. Additionally, the apprehended
entrepreneur su¤ers a (nonmonetary) utility loss . These assumptions guarantee that optimal
nancial contracts are easy to characterize and deliver a simple expression for the managers
outside option. Moreover, as the parameters ' and  can be seen as proxies for the quality of
the legal environment, they are helpful when we make cross-country comparisons of managerial
pay.
For most of the paper, we assume that the manager can leave the rm, but never leaves the
industry. We relax this assumption in Section 5, where we assume that another outside option
is to take a job in a di¤erent industry.
9It is straightforward to generalize the model so as to let the share  be a function of the talent  , but the
generalization produces few additional insights.
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2.3 Managers participation condition
Let w() be the expected value of the best alternative o¤er to a manager with talent  from
the most attractive alternative employer. To ensure that the problem is nontrivial, we assume
that pq () > w() for some  . Moreover, let
 fb = argmax

Ep [pq()  w()] (1)
be the set of optimal talent levels, i.e., those talent levels that maximize the net gain from
employing the manager. Without signicant loss of generality, we assume that this set is a
singleton from now on and refer to  fb as the rst-best talent level.
Finally, we assume that the best outside o¤er of the manager satises the inequality
w() 
Z 1
0
maxfpq()  I; 0gf(p)dp: (2)
That is, the best outside o¤er is above what the manager would earn in expectation by imme-
diately becoming an entrepreneur. Hence, w() is the managers reservation utility.
2.4 Contracting and timing
At stage t = 0, the rm proposes a compensation contract w(p; ), which the manager accepts
or rejects. The compensation contract is costlessly enforced. Since both the manager and the
rm are indi¤erent concerning the time prole of payouts, there is no reason to pay out anything
before the end of the second period. If anything, delaying payment mitigates the managers
temptation to leave. As leaving is ine¢ cient, we may restrict attention to contracts that only
pay the manager upon having completed the project.
We impose no exogenous restriction on the shape of the contract, except that it is deter-
ministic (and even this feature is without loss of generality) and non-negative. More precisely,
compensation can be any mapping w : P  T ! R+:
At stage 1, p realizes and the manager decides whether to stay or leave.
Finally, at stage 2, the project is completed, revenues realize, and the manager is paid.
Figure 1 summarizes.
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A manager with talentt is
offered a remuneration
contract w .
The contract is accepted or
rejected.
The state p realizes.
The manager
decides on staying or
leaving.
The project is completed
and the manager is paid
according to the contract.
A manager who left at
stage 1 develops outside
opportunities.
t=0 t=1 t=2
Figure 1: Timing
3 Analyzing the basic model
The rms problem is to decide which type of manager to approach and to o¤er the contract
that maximizes the rms expected surplus from the project. That is, the rm determines 
and the compensation contract w(p; ) so as to maximize expected payo¤,
U = Ep [pq()  w(p; )] ; (3)
subject to the managers participation constraint at date 0,
Ep [w(p; )]  w(); (4)
the managers retention constraint at date 1,
w(p; )  pq()  I for p 2 =; (5)
where =  P is the set of states p that makes it potentially protable and feasible for the
manager to fund an outside project.10
10A standard argument, similar to the proof of Lemma 1 in Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011), implies that any
contract that violates the retention constraint in some relevant state is suboptimal; there is another contract
that yields higher expected prot for the rm.
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Before solving the rms problem, we must characterize opportunities for the manager to
become an entrepreneur, i.e., the set =. Applying the arguments of Ellingsen and Kristiansen
(2011), the set = and the repayment to external investors r(p) are given by the protability
condition,
pq()  I  0; (6)
the entrepreneurs no-diversion constraint,
pq()  r(p)  (1  ')pq()  '; (7)
and the investorsparticipation constraint,11
r(p)  I: (8)
We solve the game backwards by rst examining the managers departure decision at date
1 (Step 1), then the contract that minimizes the cost of recruiting a manager of given talent
(Step 2), and nally we examine the rms optimal choice of talent (Step 3).
Step 1: If the outside project is unprotable, it will not be funded. If the project is protable,
the entrepreneur is able to repay I, but may be unwilling. Willingness to repay is greater when
the repayment is smaller, and is thus greatest when r(p) = I. Consequently, (7) can be written
pq()  I  (1  ')pq()  ': (9)
Since an increase in p increases the left-hand side of inequality (9) more than the right-hand
side, a unique minimum,
p^ = min

I   '
'q()
;
I
q()

;
satises inequalities (9) and (6). Consequently, we have identied the set of states in which
retention is a potential problem, = = [p^;1i.
The rms maximization problem is to choose  and w(p;  ; ) in order to maximize (3)
11By Lemma 1 in Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011) it is never optimal to o¤er a contract to outside investors
that implies that the entrepreneur makes a diversion attempt.
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subject to (4) and the retention constraint
w(p;  ; )  pq()  I if p  p^: (10)
Step 2: Keep  xed. Observe that the rm can minimize expected wage costs and satisfy
(4) and (10) by o¤ering a xed wage wf in combination with an additional state-contingent wage
wv(p) equal to the di¤erence between the outside opportunity and the xed wage (whenever
this di¤erence is positive). In the range where wv(p) is positive, the total payment is the
smallest that ensures retention. Hence, in all states in which more than wf is paid out, the pay
cannot be reduced without violating any constraint. Thus, it is impossible to rearrange the
remuneration without reducing the pay below wf in some states and thereby imposing more
risk on the agent. Let us now formally compute the optimal contract.
Because inequality (10) is linear in p, variable pay wv(p) is linear as well. Let
ph = max

I   '
'q()
;
wf + I
q()

(11)
denote the lowest value of p that (i) makes the outside project nancially feasible (so (9) holds
with equality), and (ii) more attractive than the xed wage wf (i.e., pq()   I  wf ): To
ensure that the inside wage exactly matches the outside opportunity, the variable wage must
then satisfy
wv(p) = pq()  I   wf for p  ph:
Finally, to ensure the participation of a manager with talent  at date 0, the xed wage cannot
be smaller than
wf = w() 
Z 1
ph
wv(p)f(p)dp: (12)
Since
R1
ph
wv(p)f(p)dp is decreasing in ph, wf is uniquely dened by equation (12). In Step 3
below, we show that wf () > 0 for the optimal choice of talent,  . This completes the proof
that the the optimal contract satises equation (15) and equation (14).
Step 3: The rm chooses the managers talent,  , to maximize
Ep

pq()  wf ()  wv(p; ) : (13)
Since w() = wf ()+Ep [wv(p; )] (by Step 2), the rms maximization problem with respect to
 is equivalent to maximizing surplus, see (1). Hence,   =  fb. Finally, note that Assumption
10
(2), implies wf ( fb) > 0.
To summarize, the optimal contract can be described as follows.
Proposition 1 (i) The optimal contract, w(p), is given by the sum of a linearly increasing
state-contingent wage
wv(p) = pq()  I   wf (14)
that is paid out only in good enough states p  ph; and a xed wage
wf = w() 
Z 1
ph(wf )
wv(p)f(p)dp; (15)
that is paid out in all states p.
(ii) The rm optimally hires a manager with rst-best talent,  fb:
The optimal contract is illustrated in Figure 2.
hp)(/ tqqI
Performance pay: )( pwv
p
)( pw
Fixed pay: fw
Figure 2: The gure describes the managers compensation, composed of xed pay and
variable pay, as a function of the state p.
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When p takes a value in the range between I=q() and ph, the outside project is protable,
but not nancially implementable.
The general shape of the optimal contract ts well with stylized facts. Managerial compen-
sation is more strongly related to performance when performance is high than when it is low;
see e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and Garvey and
Milbourn (2006). Indeed, the compensation contract matches exactly a rather common form
of managerial contract: the at salary in combination with either conventional or perfomance-
vesting stock options. The idea is that the manager holds a fraction  of the rms stock, where
the exercise price is set so as to correspond to the output price ph. To demonstrate the point,
and prepare for subsequent comparative static analysis, let us construct the options explicitly.
We have assumed that the rms owners have full liability. If the manager stays, the total
value of the rm, including the managers equity claim but not the xed wage, is V = pq() wf :
The value can be decomposed into a common stock (limited liability) claim worth maxfV; 0g;
which is divided between owners and the manager, and a debt worth minfV; 0g, which is
borne by the owners.12 Note that this does not preclude that the manager is given options to
buy common stock given that some conditions are satised. The corresponding share price
(normalizing the number of shares to 1) is also maxfV; 0g.13
Consider rst the case in which the managers outside project is not nancially constrained.
According to the contract, the manager gets variable pay once the output price reaches the
threshold (wf + I)=q(): Correspondingly, when the share price reaches the hurdle
h =

wf + I
q()

q()  wf
=
I + (1  )wf

;
the manager can exercise the call options at exactly the hurdle price h. Clearly, this option
package implements the desired compensation.
If the managers outside project is subject to a nancial constraint, a similar argument
applies, except the exercise price will now be below the hurdle price; that is, the option is
12If the lowest possible price, p, had a lower bound such that the rm always could pay the xed wage, i.e.
p 2 wf=q();1, then there would be no need for owners to hold a debt claim worth minfV; 0g or to assume
that owners have full liability.
13We abstract from the rms choice of capital structure and examine a rm without debt nancing.
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performance-vesting. More precisely, the exercise price remains at h, whereas the hurdle
price corresponding to the output price threshold (I   ')='q() is
bh = I   '
'q()

q()  wf
=
I   '   'wf
'
:
As noted in the Introduction, ours seems to be the rst model in which stock options with
performance-based vesting is shown to be an optimal form of compensation.
To what extent are our results a¤ected if we assume that the manager has positive wealth?
When I = 0, the only way in which wealth may matter here is as a bonding device. The rm
can ask the manager to invest ! in the rm and only return the money in case the manager
stays. Such bonding will have the benecial e¤ect of making the manager more reluctant to
leave, which in turn allows a reduction in variable pay and a corresponding increase in xed pay,
thereby reducing the risk that the manager has to bear. At rst sight, such bonding schemes
may seem exotic or unrealistic. However, many rms ask managers to pay for their option
packages and have vesting clauses that require the manager to stay with the rm for several
years after the purchase. As far as we know, our risk reduction explanation for selling options
to the manager, rather than merely giving the options for free, is new in the literature.
4 Managerial pay across rms and industries
Let us now investigate how the compensation depends on the parameters of the model and
relate these comparative static results to empirical regularities. For simplicity, we initially
focus only on the case in which the managers outside option is never subject to a nancial
constraint.14 Most results are independent of whether the nancial constraint binds or not,
except the results that directly concern the impact of investor protection. Di¤erences in investor
protection becomes relevant only when we turn to cross-country comparisons in the next section.
A su¢ cient condition for the nancial constraint to be slack is that
14Hurst and Lusardi (2004), in an emprical study of US entrepreneurs argue that liquidity constraints are
not important causal determinants of entry into self-employment. However, in countries with less developed
nancial markets, funding constraints are likely to be tighter.
13
I   '
'q()
<
I
q()
;
or equivalently
I <
'
1  ': (16)
Recall that, under this assumption, the optionsexercise price equals the hurdle price h.
To simplify the comparative static analysis, from now on we make additional assumptions
concerning functional forms. The production function q() is strictly concave, the reservation
wage function w() is strictly convex, and both functions are twice di¤erentiable. Then, it
follows from Proposition 1 (ii) that the rm optimally employs a manager with the talent level
solving the rst-order condition
pq ()  w () = 0; (17)
with the second-order condition
pq ()  w () < 0; (18)
clearly being fullled due to our functional form assumptions.
4.1 Asset exposure and corporate governance
The portability of assets vary across rms and industries. First, portability is related to tech-
nological properties of the assets. Assets that are highly portable include knowledge of possible
business projects, customer relationships and knowledge of key technologies to the rm. Other
assets, such as buildings and equipment, are not legally portable at all. Second, portability is
related to organizational properties of the rm and its environment. For example, presence of
a knowledgeable owner or of family ties between owners and the manager, as well as absence
of alternative social connections, are all likely to reduce portability.
Proposition 2 Higher asset portability  entails (i) an increase in the quantity of granted
options, and (ii) a decrease in the hurdle price h.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In other words, more portable assets implies that the managers performance threshold is
lowered and that the manager owns a larger fraction of the rm if the threshold is exceeded.
14
Available evidence indeed suggests a positive relationship between the importance of in-
tangible assets an variable pay. The link is most direct in the sizeable literature documenting
that knowledgerms utilize stocks and especially stock options to a larger degree than do
brick and mortarrms (Anderson et al. (2000); Ittner et al. (2003); Murphy (2003); Oyer and
Schaefer (2005)), and the rms themselves report that such performance-based pay is primarily
used for retention purposes (Ittner et al. (2003)). The model is likewise compatible with the
prominence of option-based compensation in growth rms, both for executives (e.g., Smith
and Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver (1993); Mehran (1995); Himmelberg et al. (1999); Palia
(2001)) and non-executives (e.g., Core and Guay (2001)).
According to Cremers and Grinstein (2010), industries with a higher fraction of outside
executives have both a larger fraction of performance related pay and a smaller degree of in-
dexing, i.e., more pay for luck; see also Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) and Murphy and Zabojnik
(2004). To the extent that the prevalence of recruitment of outside managers is a proxy for
human resource portability, this is what the model predicts.
The role of the legal and social environment is perhaps clearest in regulated industries, where
the manager is typically prevented from starting up a new business. It is well established that
managers have weaker performance incentives in regulated sectors (Murphy (1999); Frydman
and Saks (2010)). A similar mechanism might explain why there is less performance-based
pay in family rms (e.g., Kole (1997); Andersson and Reeb (2000); Bandiera et al. (2010)),
especially when the manager is a family member (Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003)).
More generally, we would expect stricter corporate governance to manifest itself as a re-
duction of portability, and thus entail less pay for luck.Therefore, the model is consistent
with the nding that pay for luck is smaller in rms with large owners, especially when these
large owners sit on the Board (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001); see also Fahlenbrach (2009)).
Likewise, it is consistent with the more specic nding that the performance hurdles for option
contracts are increasing in the quality of corporate governance (Bettis et al. (2010)).
Strictly speaking the model cannot explain variation in indexation, since it predicts that
options should always be non-indexed. However, if we were to introduce a force favoring
indexation, the model would say that portability should reduce indexation. This is in line
with the empirical nding of Rajgopal et al. (2006), who nd that there is less indexation in
industries where there is stronger competition for managers.
In addition to this cross-section evidence, Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) and Murphy and
Zabojnik (2004) argue that the relative importance of transferable talent has increased over
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time, as evidenced by the executiveseducation as well as the increasing frequency of externally
hired executives. If so, our model can account for the increase in variable pay over the last few
decades (Frydman and Saks (2010)).
4.2 Firm risk
Some rms have more volatile performance (p) than others. According to the model, what is the
relationship between the riskiness of the environment and the shape of executive compensaton?
Let more risk be depicted as a mean-preserving spread in the probability density function.
Proposition 3 Let fH(p) be a mean-preserving spread of f(p). Then, ceteris paribus, the hurdle
price and xed wage is weakly lower and the expected value of the managers options is weakly
higher under fH(p) than under f(p): The relationships are strict ifZ ph
0
FH(p)dp >
Z ph
0
F (p)dp:
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition is simple. Greater uncertainty means that it is relatively more likely that
extreme prices are observed. Very low prices do not a¤ect pay, since only a xed wage is
paid out in low states anyway. Very high prices, on the other hand, are associated with large
payments to the manager. In order for the total compensation to remain constant, it is thus
necessary to reduce the xed wage.
The result is the opposite of the prediction of classical linear incentive model, which predicts
that higher risk entails less variable wage, although the di¤erence narrows if we consider mar-
ginal pay. In our model, the marginal pay is constant once the realization of the state exceeds
the critical level ph. Overall, our result is well in line with the empirical absence of a negative
relationship between risk and incentives (Prendergast (2002)).
4.3 Firm and manager productivity
To examine the role of changes in productivity, we introduce the new parameter  and let
output be q(). The productivity parameter  may reect technology, organization, or market
conditons.
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Proposition 4 Suppose the productivity of managerial talent increases, that is,  goes up.
Then (i) the rm hires a more talented manager and (ii) the managers options become more
sensitive to market demand, that is, dwv(p)=dp increases.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The hiring of a more talented manager follows from the previous result that the hired
managers talent is optimal (Proposition 1 (ii)) together with the curvature assumptions on q
and w; which ensure that the optimal solution moves smoothly with parameters. The value of
the managers stock options becomes more sensitive to market demand because the managers
outside option improves when the productivity increases. The e¤ect of increased productivity
on the xed wage is ambiguous, however. On one hand, the increased variable pay reduces the
need for xed pay. On the other hand, the recruitment of a better manager requires an increase
in overall pay.
Proposition 4 o¤ers an explanation for why, empirically, the pay-performance sensitivity is
greater for managers with better reputation (Milbourn (2003)).
Could the proposition be used to address the relationship between the pay-performance
sensitivity and market-to-book value, which has been found to be positive by some authors
(Core and Guay (1999); Smith and Watts (1992); Core and Larcker (2002); Frydman and Saks
(2010)) and negative by others (Bettis et al. (2010); Yermack (1995))? A theoretical problem
here is that the relationship between productivity and the market-to-book value (Tobins Q) is
ambiguous in general, provided that the rm has invested optimally. Specically, given optimal
investment I, Tobins Q in our framework is simply T = pq(I)=I: The optimal investment
level is the solution to pq0(I)   1 = 0: For example, suppose the production function is
q(I) = Ik, with k 2 (0; 1). Then I = (1=pk)1=(k 1); and it follows that T (I) = 1=k. In
other words, there is no connection at all between productivity  and Tobins Q for this rather
general class of production functions.15
4.4 CEO pay across countries
The law and nanceliterature has found that access to nancing vary across countries due
to di¤erences in legal protection of investors. A manager considering leaving a rm to become
15For a related criticism of the interpretation of Tobins Q as a measure of productivity, see Dybvig and
Warachka (2010).
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an entrepreneur will take into account the nancing opportunities of new ventures. Knowing
the managers outside options, the rms owners in turn adjust the compensation package.
We now analyze the impact of nancial constraints on optimal compensation. That is, we
violate Assumption (16) and instead assume that I is so large as to produce the inequality16
(1  ')I   
'
> w( fb): (19)
Assumption (19) is satised when the legal protection of investors is weak (low ' and ) or
a large investment (high I) is needed to start the outside project.
Proposition 5 If condition (19) holds, then improved investor protection (higher ' or ) im-
plies that the manager receives less xed pay wf , faces a lower hurdle price bh, and receives more
valuable stock options, Ep[wv(p)].
Proof: See Appendix A.
The result is consistent with the fact that, compared to managers in other countries, US
CEOs receive a larger fraction of their pay as performance pay (Abowd and Kaplan (1999);
Conyon et al. (2011); Fernandes et al. (2010)). Note that Kumar et al. (2001) nd emprical
evidence for a negative correlation between rm size and legal development. Where it is easy
for managers to set up their own business, variable pay should be more prominent.
5 Severance pay
Hitherto, we have assumed that the manager will only leave the job for another job in the same
industry. Realistically, managers sometimes change industry, especially when the own industry
is declining. Such changes are often e¢ cient, as talented managers should be matched with
protable projects. How should the contract be designed to accommodate e¢ cient transitions?
Let w() be the wage o¤er from a rm in an unrelated industry to a manager with talent
 at date 1, with 0 <  < 1: The manager should leave to another industry if the remuneration
in the other industry exceeds the current rms loss from the managers departure;
w() > (1  )pq()
16Inequality (19) follows from w()  wf () (total wage exceeds xed wage) and (I + ')='q() > (I +
wf ())=q() (nancially constrained manager).
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or, equivalently, if
p 6 ps = w()
(1  )q() :
To make the problem non-trivial, assume that ps  ph: In order to induce the manager to leave
in the states p 6 ps, the contract can give the rm the right to replace the manager, who in
exchange is entitled to a severance pay s = wf   w(): Under this contract, separation is
e¢ cient and the workers utility is independent of whether there is separation or not.
Proposition 6 Suppose an unrelated industry is o¤ering wage w () at date 1 (0 <  < 1).
(i) Then the optimal contract is the same as in Proposition 1, except that in states p 2 [0; ps]
the manager leaves the rm and receives a severance pay s = wf   w(). (ii) The likelihood
of turnover is higher when the rms industry is performing badly relative to other industries
(p is low) and when the inter-industry portability of human capital, ; is high.
If the owner has all the bargaining power, the optimal contracts outcome can alternatively
be implemented by renegotiating the original contract in states p < ps. In this sense, the model
is consistent with the evidence that severance pay is usually awarded on a discretionary basis
by the board of directors and not according to terms of an employment agreement (Yermack
(2006)).17 Since it may be di¢ cult to contract explicitly on , as the managers best alternative
is not always known in advance, discretion may even be strictly preferred.
The feature that severance pay makes up for the loss in expected compensation, wf w(),
rhymes well with Yermacks (2006) interpretation of severance pay data: boards use severance
pay to assure CEOs of a minimum lifetime wage level.
The predicted role of industry performance p on turnover is consistent with the central reg-
ularity emphasized by Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming): They nd that CEOs are mostly red
after bad rm performance caused by factors beyond the managers control, especially when the
rms industry is performing poorly. As Jenter and Kanaan note, this behavior by corporate
boards is inexplicable, or suggestive of irrationality, in the incentive provision framework. Once
we consider the retention motive, it makes a lot more sense to keep talented managers when the
industry performs well and release them (and reduce the level of compensation for the incoming
manager) when the industry declines.
17Discretionary severance pay is di¢ cult to reconcile with models that emphasize ex ante incentive issues,
such as those of Almazan and Suarez (2003), Inderst and Mueller (2010), and Manso (2011). In these models,
it is necessary to commit to severance pay in advance.
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Likewise, the predicted role of inter-industry portability of the managers human capital, ,
is consistent with the view that increased managerial turnover is related to the increased im-
portance of general, as opposed to rm-specic or industry-specic, managerial skills (Murphy
and Zabojnik (2004), Murphy and Zabojnik (2006), Frydman (2005)).
6 Search for uncertain outside opportunities
We have assumed that the manager always knows the value of the outside opportunity, and
that the value of the outside opportunity is perfectly correlated with the inside value. In this
section, we show that our main insights hold true also if we simultaneously relax both these
assumptions. Moreover, our modied set-up allows us to study e¢ cient intra-industry departure
and to rationalize caps on total pay.
The model is as before, except for the following changes. In order to identify an outside
opportunity, the manager has to pay a positive search cost s at stage 1, after the state p is real-
ized. For example, we might think of searching as a preliminary development e¤ort or contacts
with other prospective business partners. Search is observable and veriable, so contracts can
depend on whether it takes place. (The results do not depend on perfect observability; what
we need is that it is possible to inict large enough expected penalties on the seach activity.)
At stage 1, if and when the manager searches, the value of the outside opportunity is
uncertain. Its value is epq()  I; where e = + , and the stochastic term  satises E [] = 0;
we impose no specic distributional assumptions:
6.1 Analysis
For a given outside alternative (realization of e), it is e¢ cient that the manager departs if and
only if the value of the outside option exceeds the rms loss from turnover,
epq()  I  (1  )pq():
The expected gain from search, given that the manager returns in case of bad outcomes is
G(p) = E
h
max

(e   (1  ))pq()  I; 0i :
Note that G0(p) > 0. Searching is e¢ cient if and only if the expected gain exceeds the costs,
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G(p)  s:
Dene pcap as the threshold G(pcap) = s:
Since the managers compensation equals the ex ante reservation wage, the cost of any
ine¢ ciencies will be borne by the owners. Hence, if possible, a wage contract should encourage
e¢ cient search and separation. In other words, there should be search if and only if p  pcap
and separation upon search if and only if epq()   I  (1   )pq(). (This condition should
also hold o¤ the equilibrium path; the rm cannot commit to behave ine¢ ciently.)
We now describe a contract that implements the optimal outcomes and leaves the manager
with an expected remuneration equal to her reservation wage. As before, the contract species
a xed wage for all su¢ ciently low p. The reason is that the expected outside option is so
small that it is ine¢ cient for the manager to search, and also so small that the manager is not
tempted to search. In the next interval, p is such that this xed wage is not large enough to
discourage search. However, search is still ine¢ cient and should thus be discouraged through
the use of variable pay Finally, for su¢ ciently large p, the outside option is quite likely to be
more valuable than the inside option, and the worker should search. Once the state enters this
interval, the variable pay remains capped at some maximum value. Specically, there is an
optimal search-contingent contract with the following properties.
Proposition 7 (i) If the manager does not search, there is an optimal contract w(p) that
pays a linearly increasing state-contingent wage
w^v(p) = min [p; pcap] q()  I   w^f   s
in all states p above threshold state ps (dened by equation (11)) together with a xed wage
w^f = w() 
Z pcap
ps(w^f )
w^v(p)f(p)dp 
Z 1
pcap
[pq()  I   s] f(p)dp;
in all states.
(ii) If the manager searches, the contract pays the outside option
wr = peq()  I
if (e   (1  ))pq()  I < 0; and anything up to w(pcap) otherwise.
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(iii) The rm optimally hires a manager with rst-best talent,  fb:
The only important di¤erence compared to the model without search is that there can now
be e¢ cient separation. In order to induce the worker to leave when this is e¢ cient, there must
be a cap on variable pay. Otherwise, everything is essentially as before. (Hence, we omit the
formal proof.) Note that the contractual payments when there is search are the same as the
payments that would be negotiated if there were no contract in this case. Thus, a natural
interpretation of the model is that it species a payment for all states in which the manager
does not search, while negotiating new payments in case the manager searches. We might thus
think of this case as contract renegotiation.
The model has a number of immediate implications: An increase in the search cost s entails
higher xed pay, lower variable pay, and less turnover; an increase in portability  increases both
variable pay and turnover; and, obviously, an increase in the cost of replacing the manager 
reduces turnover. A mean-preserving spread in the uncertain component of the outside option
reduces the pay cap, while entailing more turnover as well as more contract renegotiation.
Finally, observe that, for the rm, the prospect of turnover is not at all problematic. To the
contrary, the fact that the manager may end up with an attractive outside job simply means
that the rm may reduce the xed wage and thereby appropriate the value of the turnover
option. Hence, the model is consistent with the observation that some rms actively encourage
key personnel to become entrepreneurs. A recent article in New York Times provides several
examples from Silicon Valley where rms attract and keep talent by promising to help workers
in setting up their own businesses at a later stage (e.g., by o¤ering advise, to develop business
plans, to establish contact with venture capital rms)."At Square, the co-founder and chief
executive, Jack Dorsey, who also co-founded Twitter, gives employees 20-minute lessons on
topics like how to raise venture capital. Every employee can view Squares product plans and
nancials to learn about building a business. It helps people stay but also helps them to go,
said Glenn Kelman, Redns chief executive." by Clare Cain Miller and Jenna Wortham, New
York Times, March 25, 2011.
7 Final remarks
We have argued that many features of managerial compensation can be understood in light
of the retention motive: When the managers outside option does not bind, a xed salary is
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optimal, but when the state is su¢ ciently favorable, pay must adapt to match the managers
most attractive outside option.
Besides rationalizing the cross-sectional evidence described above, we think that the model
o¤ers a plausible explanation for the vast increase in executive stock options over the last few
decades (Frydman and Saks (2010)). This movement has gone hand in hand with greater
managerial turnover, more exernal recruitment, managers with more general education, and
better access to outside nancing. In short, stock options has become more important precisely
when the managersoutside options are more likely to be binding.
8 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i) follows directly from the fact that the option grant is
proportional to . To prove (ii), recall that (as long as the managers participation constraint
binds),  does not a¤ect  :Thus, di¤erentiation of the hurdle price equation
h =
I + (1  )wf

;
yields
dh
d
=
1
2

(1  )dw
f
d
  wf   I

:
We only lack the sign of dwf=d. To nd it, di¤erentiate (14) and (15) to get
dwv(p)
d
= pq()  dw
f
d
and
dwf
d
=  
Z 1
h
dwv(p)
d
f(p)dp;
where the second computation uses the fact that wv(h) = 0: Substitute to get
dwv(p)
d
= pq() +
Z 1
h
dwv(p)
d
f(p)dp:
To see that this expression is positive, suppose the contrary that it is negative. Since the
right-hand side is increasing in p, and p is nonnegative, this would mean that the integral is
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negative. But since f(p) is a probability density function, the integral cannot be smaller than
dwv(h)=d, and hence the equation is violated at p = h. Having shown that dwv(p)=d > 0 for
all p, it follows that dwf=d < 0; and hence that dh=d < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3: First consider the e¤ect on expected performance pay. To show
that expected performance pay is increasing in an MPS we need to show thatZ 1
ph
 
pq( ; )  I   wf () fH(p)dp > Z 1
ph
 
pq( ; )  I   wf () f(p)dp: (20)
By assumption (16), we have
ph =
I + wf ()
q( ; )
:
Observe thatZ 1
ph
 
pq( ; )  I   wf () f(p)dp = Z 1
0
 
pq( ; )  I   wf () f(p)dp (21)
 
Z ph
0
 
pq( ; )  I   wf () f(p)dp
= pq( ; )  I   wf ()
 
Z ph
0
 
pq( ; )  I   wf () f(p)dp
= pq( ; )  I   wf () + q( ; )
Z ph
0
F (p)dp:
The last equality follows from integration by parts. By deriving the analogous expression for
fH , it follows that inequality (20) holds if
R ph
0
F (p)dp  R ph
0
FH(p)dp; which is a consequence
of the denition of FH . The inequality (20) is strict if
R ph
0
F (p)dp <
R ph
0
FH(p)dp. Recall that
Assumption (2) implies that the participation constraint is binding. Because the expected per-
formance pay is increasing in an MPS (for a xed wf ()), wf () decreases until the managers
participation constraint (15) is again binding. Hence the expected performance pay is increas-
ing, and wf () and the corresponding hurdle price (I + (1  )wf ())= are decreasing in an
MPS.
Proof of Proposition 4: For part (ii) to hold, we require d2wv=dpd > 0 for p  ph.
From equation (14) we have
dwv
dp
= q();
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and it follows that
d2wv
dpd
= q() + q ()
d 
d
:
Since both q() and q () are positive, part (ii) follows if part (i) holds. Di¤erentiating (17)
with respect to  ; we have
d 
d
=   pq ()
pq ()  w ()
> 0:
And since the denominator is negative by (18), part (i) holds.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that the hurdle price is
bh = I   '   'wf
'
;
which is decreasing in ' and  for a xedwf . Hence, the expected performance pay,
R1
ph
wv(p; )f(p)dp;
is increasing in ' and  for a xed wf (). Since the managers participation constraint is
binding, wf () must decrease as expected performance pay increases (equation (15)). Hence
improved legal protection (increased ' and ) reduces the hurdle price, bh; and xed pay, wf ();
while raising the expected performance pay,
R1
ph
wv(p; )f(p)dp.
9 Appendix B: Risk-averse manager
The manager is risk averse with utility function u(w), u0(w)  0; u00(w)  0: Owners are
risk neutral and o¤er a wage, wr( ; p) to attract the manager at date 0 (ex ante participation
constraint) and to retain the manager after p is realized (ex post participation constraint).
The manager has a protable outside project if and only p  I
q()
and the manager will
have incentives to repay investors if
u (pq()  I)  u((1  ')pq())  'u(): (22)
This is the risk-averse version of inequality (7). Let pr be the lowest value satisfying (22).
The manager has a protable and fundable project if p  p^ = min
h
pr; I
q()
i
.
Consider p  p^: Observe that the managers will not depart as long as she receives a wage
wr( ; p) satisfying
u(wr( ; p))  u (pq()  I) ;
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or simpler
wr( ; p)  pq()  I; (23)
for all p  p^. Observe that linear inequality (23) is the same as (5) (with a risk-neutral
manager).
The owners cost minimization problem given manager talent  is
min
wr(p;)
Ep [w
r(p; )]
subject to the retention constraint (23) and the ex ante participation constraint
u(w()) 
Z 1
0
u(wr(p; ))f(p)dp:
It follows that unless the linear inequality (23) is binding, the manager receives a xed wage. If
the linear inequality is binding, the wage is linearly increasing in p such that the variable pay
is minimized and the manager stays.
Since the manager receives an expected wage equal to her reservation wage and the owners
capture the net surplus, the owners recuite rst-best talent,  fb: To summarize;
Proposition 8 (i) The optimal contract to a risk-averse manager, wr(p), is given by the sum
of a linearly increasing state-contingent wage
wvr(p) = pq()  I   wfr (24)
that is paid out only in good enough states p  phr; and a xed wage,wfr(), such that
u(w()) =
Z 1
0
u(wvr(p) + wfr())f(p)dp; (25)
that is paid out in all states p.
(ii) The hurdle price is set such that the outside opportunity in fundable and better than only
receiving the xed wage only
phr = max

pr;
I + wfr
q()

:
(iii) The rm optimally hires a manager with rst-best talent,  fb:
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